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SHELLEY v. KRAEMER: NOTES
FOR A REVISED OPINION*
Louis hN= t
For the constitutional lawyer, Shelley v. Kraemer' was a portentous decision. If its immediate promise was largely for Negro
rights, it cast a shadow of major consequences far beyond racial questions. The case suggested a new and far-reaching concept of "state
action" and state responsibility,' a new and far-reaching domain of
federal jurisdiction, a new and far-reaching readjustment of relationships between government and the individual. The respective constitutional responsibilities of federal and state government in regard to
the individual citizen, sharply revised from the original pattern when
the fourteenth amendment was adopted, faced further radical revision
in the ambiguous promise of the new doctrine announced by the Court
in 1948.
Shelley v. Kraemer was hailed as the,promise of another new deal
for the individual-particularly the Negro individual-, but students
of constitutional law were troubled by it from the beginning. Those
alert to the responsibility of the Court to afford principled decision,
justified by language, history, and other considerations relevant to
* My colleague, Paul Mishldn, is not responsible for anything in this article. He
has my gratitude for the clarification which our discussions have brought.

-Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania.
LL.B. 1940, Harvard University.

A.B. 1937, Yeshiva College;

1334 U.S. 1 (1948).

2 This article will direct itself to the problem of state responsibility for private
discrimination under the equal protection clause. Much of what is said may apply
also to state responsibility for other private actions which may constitute deprivation

of property or liberty without due process of law. But the problems may be sufficiently different to prevent automatic transfer.
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constitutional adjudication, were disturbed by an opinion of the Court
which, to them, did not "wash." They were not satisfied that the
opinion provided a doctrine of decision which governed the case before
the Court, dealt rationally with the past, and promised to apply to
tomorrow's case. Others too, less concerned perhaps with the jurisprudence of the Court, admitted that while Shelley was a good decision,
it was not possible to tell how far the Court would go in the next case.
Today, fourteen years later, Shelley v. Kraemer still weighs on
critical spirits. The Court has not seized opportunities to reconsider
or clarify. To professional critics of the Court's work, the case has
become a citation for inadequacy in the exercise of the judicial function
in constitutional cases.' Some, to whom the Court's opinion leaves too
much to be desired, have felt compelled to conclude that the case was
wrongly decided, that the Court must reverse itself or drastically limit
the holding of the case. Others of us, while criticizing the opinion of
the Court, insist that the case was rightly decided and that a more
satisfactory opinion can be written.' But, particularly because the result in Shelley "jumps with my preconceptions" and hopes, it is not
enough to declare that one can support the decision better than the
Court did; we are challenged to show that sturdier foundations for
the decision can in fact be laid.
There have been attempts to write a new opinion for the Court.5
Another effort, in the pages that follow, claims justification in that the
previous attempts with which I am acquainted do not seem wholly
satisfactory. At best, these entail major revisions, qualifications, or
limitations of the doctrine and opinion of the case; they are not changes
which the Court can easily accept as its own when it faces the next
case. I have expressed the belief that a more satisfactory opinion can
be written, an opinion which builds on what the Court has said and
follows where the Court leads. This is my attempt to write it.
I. CRITICISM OF THE COURT'S OPINION

What is Shelley v. Kraemer? Why has the Court's opinion been
found wanting?
The facts in Shelley are well known. Briefly, property subject to
a restrictive covenant had been conveyed to Shelley, a Negro. Owners
of nearby property, parties to the restrictive covenant, brought suit
s See, e.g., Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARv.
L. REv.
1, 29 (1959), quoted in text accompanying notes 7 and 8 infra.
4

E.g., Henldn, Some Reflections on Current Constitutional Controversy, 109
U. PA. L. REv. 637, 661-62 (1961).
See e.g., Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to
Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 6 (1959). Another interesting analysis
is Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 CoLUm. L. REv. 1083, 1108-20 (1960).
See note 24 infra.
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to restrain Shelley from taking possession and to have his title divested
and revested in the grantor. The state courts granted the relief requested. The Supreme Court reversed unanimously, three Justices not
participating.
The opinion of the Court, by Mr. Chief Justice Vinson, may be
summarized as follows: The fourteenth amendment addresses itself
only to states, not to private persons. Private persons remain free to
discriminate against others even on grounds of race and color. The
restrictive covenant, per se, does not violate any constitutional prohibition. But the right to acquire, enjoy, or dispose of property is
clearly protected by the fourteenth amendment from discriminatory
state action. The state cannot restrict a Negro's right to property on
account of his race. It could not do so by statute. It cannot do so by
the actions of its courts. Judicial action is, of course, clearly "state
action" for purposes of the fourteenth amendment. The courts of the
state could not enforce a restrictive covenant required by statute; they
can no more do so under the common law of the state. State judicial
enforcement of these covenants is forbidden state action.
The Court's opinion has been analyzed and parsed and subjected
to repeated scrutiny. No matter how one looked at it, it appeared
that-without frankly admitting it-the Court was making new constitutional law. More serious, critics found unacceptable the reasons the
Court gave for its result. The fourteenth amendment, the Court has
insisted from the beginning, controls only governmental action, the
action of the state and not the acts of private persons against each
other. In this case the Supreme Court was overturning a discrimination which did not originate with the state but was essentially the
discrimination of one private person against another. This, it was
felt, was a misapplication of the intent of the amendment with grave
implications for federal government under the Constitution. When
the Court, eighty years ago, affirmed that the fourteenth amendment
applies only to "state action," ' it was not merely giving literal interpretation to constitutional language. The requirement of state action
was an affirmation, in particular, that by this amendment the Constitution did not render relations between individuals a matter of federal
concern, whether by judicial scrutiny or congressional regulation. In
Shelley, the Court, orienting on the result desired, failed to take account
of the reflections of federalism in the fourteenth amendment and invaded the individual's freedom to be irrational which the amendment
had never intended to eliminate, or even to deal with.
OE.g., Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11-19 (1883); Ex parte Virginia, 100

U.S. 339, 344-45 (1880).
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There was also specific criticism of the Court's reasoning.
fessor Herbert Wechsler, for example, said:

Pro-

Assuming that the Constitution speaks to state discrimination
on the ground of race but not to such discrimination by an
individual even in the use or distribution of his property,
although his freedom may no doubt be limited by common
law or statute, why is the enforcement of the private covenant
a state discrimination rather than a legal recognition of the
freedom of the individual? That the action of the state court
is action of the state, the point Mr. Chief Justice Vinson emphasizes in the Court's opinion is, of course, entirely obvious.
What is not obvious, and is the crucial step, is that the state
may properly be charged with the discrimination when it
does no more than give effect to an agreement that the individual involved is, by hypothesis, entirely free to make.7
The Court's reasons become doubly unacceptable if they lead
inevitably where the Court is not prepared to go. Professor Wechsler
continues:
Again, one is obliged to ask: What is the principle involved?
Is the state forbidden to effectuate a will that draws a racial
line, a will that can accomplish any disposition only through
the aid of law, or is it a sufficient answer there that the discrimination was the testator's and not the state's? May not
the state employ its law to vindicate the privacy of property
against a trespasser, regardless of the grounds of his exclusion, or does it embrace the owner's reasons for excluding if
it buttresses his power by the law? Would a declaratory
judgment that a fee is determinable if a racially restrictive
limitation should be violated represent discrimination by the
state upon the racial ground? Would a judgment of
ejectment? 8
Professor Wechsler, it appears, does not believe that the Court
is prepared to hold that the fourteenth amendment prevents the state
from enforcing private discrimination in every case where the state
itself could not by legislation enact or require such discrimination. He
does not believe, for example, that the Supreme Court would prevent
the state from probating a will which left money to a white charity
only, although the state could not itself require such discrimination in
a bequest, or itself make such a discriminatory expenditure of funds.
He does not believe that the Supreme Court would forbid a state to
enforce, by police ejection or by judgment of trespass, civil or criminal,
an objection by a private person to the presence of another on his
7
Wechsler, mupra note 3, at 29. (Footnote omitted.)
8 Id. at 29-30. (Footnotes omitted.)
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property, although the objection is based on the intruder's race. If
some may be prepared to go where Professor Wechsler hesitates to
go, even they may hesitate to conclude that the Supreme Court would
prevent a state from probating a will leaving money to a group or
institution of a particular religious denomination, or from enforcing
exclusion, on the basis of religious difference, from church, or church
membership, or cemetery, although the state itself could not make or
require these discriminations.
Indeed, the difficulty may lie even deeper, as the testamentary
cases would seem to prove. If Shelley v. Kraemer were read to hold
that a state cannot enforce a discrimination which it could not itself
make, the state could not probate, enforce, or administer many common
bequests. The fourteenth amendment forbids discrimination not only
on the basis of race or color; it also forbids state discrimination on
any basis which is capricious or whimsical. But any bequest which
favors A rather than B may be capricious or whimsical. In such a
case, the state could not by statute require the testator to leave his
money to A. Apart, then, from-bequests to special categories, to wife
and children, for example--where an argument can be made that the
category is reasonable-no bequest could be enforced if the enforcement were deemed to make the state responsible for the "discrimination." Similarly, so long as an individual may capriciously decide who
may, and who may not enter upon his property, the enforcement of
trespass would not be possible, even where the exclusion had nothing
to do with racial discrimination but was based on some other caprice.
In the sale of land, too, the fact that the vendor arbitrarily contracted
to sell to A rather than to B might be argued to prevent a court from
enforcing the sale because the state would thereby make the arbitrary
selection its own.
Shelley v. Kraemer obviously does not portend these extreme results. It cannot stand for a universal proposition that a court cannot
enforce a private discrimination if the state could not itself make that
discrimination. One must seek a different "principle" which would
justify the result in Shelley without requiring unacceptable results in
other cases. At least, the doctrine suggested by the Court must have
some qualification to explain different results in some of the cases
raised by the critics.
Suggested revisions have been various. The most frequent suggestion would limit Shelley to restrictive covenants-a kind of "zoning" for which the state is responsible even when perpetrated by private
persons.9 The most interesting suggestion is that of Professor Louis
9 See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 5, at 1115-18.

Compare note 54 infra.
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Pollak: he would apply Shelley v. Kraemer to prevent the state from
enforcing a discrimination by one who does not wish to discriminate;
but he would allow the state to give its support to willing discrimination
without violating the fourteenth amendment.1' With this qualification
the Shelley doctrine would apply to the trespass and bequest cases as
well.
Pollak, supra note 5, at 13:
The line sought to be drawn is that beyond which the state assists a
private person in seeing to it that others behave in a fashion which the state
could not itself have ordained. The principle underlying the distinction is
this: the fourteenth amendment permits each his personal prejudices and
guarantees him free speech and press and worship, together with a degree
of free economic enterprise, as instruments with which to persuade others
to adopt his prejudices; but access to state aid to induce others to conform
is barred.
For Professor Pollak, then, Shelley was rightly decided because the state had
attempted to compel a would-be grantor of property, who did not wish to discriminate,
to abide by a discriminatory covenant. That was forbidden state action not merely
because the courts were helping to enforce a discrimination, but because, since the
actor did not wish to discriminate, there would have been no effective discrimination
but for the action of the state courts.
As Professor Pollak recognizes, his proposal requires important limitation of
Shelley v. Kraemer, and raises a number of possible objections. One may argue,
for instance, that while the fourteenth amendment may perhaps protect an individual's
"liberty" to refuse to discriminate as it may protect another's liberty to discriminate,
that hardly seems to be the focus of the equal protection clause. That clause seems
designed to protect the victim against discrimination, not to protect an unwilling
"actor" against being compelled to discriminate. It would seem also an eccentric
constitutional provision which protected the aggrieved against involuntary discrimination by private persons but not against voluntary private discrimination. Moreover,
the distinction is offered as a definition of "state action." But whether the judgment
of a court enforces a voluntary discrimination or compels a no-longer-voluntary discrimination, the discrimination is private in origin; in both cases it requires a court
judgment to make the discrimination effective. It is difficult to see why it is not
"state action" when a court gives effect to a restrictive covenant, but it becomes
"state action" when a court enforces the covenant after a party repents or when one
who has succeeded to rights in property does not wish to observe the discrimination.
Finally, in Shelley itself, is it acceptable to think of the case as one in which the
state was compelling discrimination by a grantor of property who no longer wished
to discriminate? In essence, the state was enforcing discrimination by the other
parties to the covenant who continued to insist upon the discrimination: their interest
remained; the grantor was eliminating himself and would seem to have little claim
to sympathy.
The suggested distinction seems even more troublesome when applied to the
bequests and ejectments. (Professor Pollak expressly applies his distinction to
Gordon v. Gordon, 332 Mass. 197, 124 N.E.2d 228, cert. denied, 349 U.S. 947 (1955).
Pollak, supra note 5, at 6-9, 11-13.) In the case of a discriminatory will, whether
the executor does or does not wish to carry out the discrimination, the state is being
asked to enforce the discrimination insisted upon by the deceased. One may sympathize with a person having administrative responsibility who is reluctant to carry
out a directive to discriminate, but he presumably assumed the task knowing of the
requirement that he discriminate. In any event, it does not seem logical that the
reluctance of the executor should determine whether state enforcement is "state action,"
whether the discrimination will be given effect Nor does it seem logical, as would
seem to be the consequence of the proposed distinctions, that a church could discriminate or exclude on denominational grounds and invoke the aid of the courts
to give effect to the discrimination, but the state court could not similarly enforce
such discrimination at the behest of a staunch parishioner against deviating vestry.
Compare Davis v. Scher, 356 Mich. 291, 97 N.W.2d 137 (1959). And when there
is no social or religions discrimination involved, can a trustee refuse to administer
a trust or bequest for the benefit of A, selected whimsically by the testator, because
the trustee might prefer B?
10
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In varying degrees all the suggestions require rejection or radical
revision of the Court's opinion. All would dash some of the hopes
and frustrate much of the promise of Shelley. Some of the proposals
introduce new distinctions difficult to justify, difficult, too, to rationalize
in the light of the language, purposes, and history of the fourteenth
amendment; and, on the other hand, they may foreclose other distinctions which seem waranted by the Constitution. One feels that Shelley
v. Kraemer is "correct" and should apply beyond the special case of the
restrictive covenant. The feeling persists that Shelley should go further
than Professor Pollak suggests, should bar even "voluntary" discrimination by restrictive covenant and also, perhaps, voluntary discrimination or segregation of a public character. The feeling persists, on
the other hand, that Shelley cannot go as far as its logic leads, that
restrictive covenants are different from the testamentary and "social"
trespass cases, and that in some of the latter instances, at least, the
state may "enforce" the discrimination whether it be willing or reluctant. The feeling persists, too, that even in the testamentary cases
and perhaps in trespass cases not involving private homes, there may
be a basis for distinction between racial and some kinds of religious
discrimination. While "feelings" hardly decide constitutional cases,
they may well reflect historical and social institutions and attitudes not
irrelevant to concepts which permeate the fourteenth amendment. It
remains to set forth a theory to justify these distinctions which would
be consistent with the language and history of the amendment, with its
philosophy of the relationship between government and individuals
under our federal system, and with what the Supreme Court has said
and held.
II. THE BASIS FOR A REVISED OPINION
I propose for consideration a revised opinion in Shelley v.
Kraemer, based on the following "memorandum."
A. The Compass of the Fourteenth Amendment
The fourteenth amendment is addressed to government, to state
government. It does not speak to individuals; it contains no limitations
upon individuals or on private action. To the states, the fourteenth
amendment addresses prohibitions. Prima facie, at least, it tells the
states what they must not do; it does not impose affirmative obligations upon them. The state must not deny due process; the state must
not deny the equal protection of the laws.
This has been the interpretation of the fourteenth amendment,
virtually without dissent. It is the interpretation to which the words
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of the amendment lead. It is consistent with the philosophy of the
Constitution " and of the fourteenth amendment.-" The Court, in
effect, reaffirmed this interpretation in Shelley and has abided by
it since.
The fourteenth amendment, then, does not impose on any person
a duty not to discriminate against another on any grounds whatever.
The fourteenth amendment does not confer upon any person the
right to social and economic equality. The fourteenth amendment
does not cast upon the states an affirmative obligation to assure to
every individual fundamental social and economic rights.
11 A "liberal" constitution rooted in the political thought of the 18th century,

the United States Constitution, with its Bill of Rights, established limitations on
government and declared "natural" rights and freedoms of the individual immune
to encroachment by government. The justice it hoped to establish was, in Aristotle's
terms, roughly, commutative rather than distributive. It wished to insure tranquility
and secure liberty, not to achieve equality or economic security. It hoped to promote
the general welfare; it did not require government to guarantee individual welfare.
Unlike constitutions reflecting "welfare state" concepts of the 20th century, the United
States Constitution did not declare or recognize social or economic goals and impose
on government affirmative obligations to achieve, maintain, or guarantee them. It
did not guarantee against hunger or slavery, against economic inadequacy or social
inequality. The Constitution may have permitted, it did not require New Deal
meliorism.
Of course, it may be that in view of "our whole experience," of "what this country
has become," the "constitution we are expounding" may yet be read as imposing
Under
affirmative obligations on government to assure bread, work, "security."
pressures resulting from Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), courts
may approach finding a constitutional right to an elementary education. The Constitution may some day be read also to guarantee rights of social equality-a covenant
of rights which government must not only respect but achieve and maintain. For
now, it seems, we are not yet there; the welfare state in the United States-even
at minimum levels-has not yet been recognized as a constitutional requirement
12 While there is still controversy as to whether the Civil War amendments made
applicable to the states all or many of the constitutional limitations originally applied
to the federal government, there is little persuasive evidence that they represented
a different philosophy, that they intended to impose on the states affirmative obligations
to achieve and guarantee individual rights-obligations which had never been borne
by the federal government.

The fourteenth amendment, at least, does not seem to have had that purpose.
It intended a radical change in our federalism by subjecting to the control of the
Federal Constitution and of a federal congress and judiciary large areas of state
action and responsibility. The amendment did not intend radical changes in philosophy
of government. It was not careless drafting but intentional expression of accepted
political philosophy when the fourteenth amendment was written as a prohibition
and not as an obligation, and the "Thou shalt not' of this amendment was addressed
to government, to the state governments.
The thirteenth amendment may be different. It was directed against an institution which was not created or imposed by government; slavery was an institution
of private property which enjoyed the protection of local government like other
private property. In abolishing and outlawing slavery, the thirteenth amendment
not only denied to slavery the protection of local law but guaranteed freedom from
slavery for every human being against every other. And the agencies of government,
it might be argued, were required to give effect to this prohibition, although, even
as to Congress, the amendment only authorized but did not command action to make
the guarantee effective.
For the suggestion that the fifteenth amendment may also be different, see note
15 infra.
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"State Action" and State Responsibility
When a state, in some official act, discriminates on the basis of
race or some other irrational ground, the official act constitutes a
denial of equal protection of the laws. The official action of the state
may, of course, be judicial as well as legislative or executive. The
state denies equal protection to a Negro when it convicts him of crime
on the verdict of a jury from which Negroes had been systematically
excluded. The state denies due process when its courts convict a person by a trial which included some fundamental unfairness.
Cases like Shelley v. Kraemer do not involve racial discrimination
by the state or, originally at least, any other official act denying rights
to anyone. These cases spring from private discrimination or the
assertion of other private "rights" which impinge on another private
person. Generally, the state becomes actively involved only when its
aid-usually the aid of its courts-is invoked to enforce or effectuate
the private discrimination. The issue in these cases is usually said to
be whether there was "state action." But, at least in these cases, the
phrase "state action" no longer contributes to clarity. The prohibitions
of the fourteenth amendment include no reference to "action" by the
state. It has long been clear that the state can violate the amendment
by "inaction" as well as by "action"-by what it does not do as well
as by what it does. On the other hand, there are situations where
there is surely some "action" by the state but the action is not deemed
sufficient to involve the state and to warrant charging it with the
denial of rights. Or, while the state "acted" and is responsible for
what happened, what happened is not deemed a violation of rights
protected by the Constitution. The question, then, is not whether a
state has "acted," but whether its role in the circumstances has denied
equal protection-whether because of the character of state involvement, or the relation of the state to the private acts in issue, there has
been a denial for which the state should be held responsible.
Bases for State Responsibility
That the question in these cases is whether the state is responsible
for a denial of rights has been emphasized by the Supreme Court; the
Court has also recognized the difficulty in defining the bases of state
responsibility. "[T] o fashion and apply a precise formula for recognition of state responsibility under the Equal Protection Clause is an
One
'impossible task' which 'This Court has never attempted.' "13
13 Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
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can only seek guidance in what the Court has done. The state is
responsible for acts of its officials which are not authorized, even where
the acts were forbidden by state law.' 4 The state is responsible when it
delegates, authorizes, or acquiesces in the exercise by private bodies
of functions that are essentially "governmental" in character, like the
conduct of primary elections that are an integral part of the election
process. 5 The state is responsible when it permits "a corporation to
govern a community of citizens." 16 The state which owns and leases
property to a private body is responsible for the conduct of its lessee,
at least where the property is owned and used as in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority." Government is responsible when it asserts
its interest and its authority in private activity, even if it refrains from
regulating it."8 Government should be held responsible, it has been
suggested, where private organizations-such as labor unions-operate
pursuant to a scheme of systematic statutory regulation and encouragement."9
In these cases, the active discrimination or deprivation was that
of a private organization or person; the state did not perpetrate the
denial, require it, or participate in it-at least in the first instance. The
state was nevertheless held responsible because of the special character
of the private activity or some special state relationship to it; the
discriminatory activities were not "strictly private." One or more of
these cases might indeed provide the courts with an adequate narrow
ground for holding the state responsible in some "Shelley v. Kraemer"
14 United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 25 (1960) ; Iowa-Des Moines Nat'l Bank
v. Bennett, 284 U.S. 239 (1931). See also Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
15 Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649
(1944); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932).
In the later voting cases the Court found violations of the fifteenth amendment
rather than the fourteenth. Although both amendments are prohibitions on the states,
it has been suggested that the fifteenth "must impose on the states a heavier affirmative
duty to assure an equal franchise than does the fourteenth." Pollak, supra note 5, at 23.
16 Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946).
17 365 U.S. 715 (1961). See notes 22-23 infra and accompanying text.
's See Public Util. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 462 (1952).
19 See Railway Employes' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 231-32 (1956), and
Wellington, The Constitution, the Labor Union, and "Governmental Action", 70

L.J. 345, 358-59 (1961), with Professor Wellington's own views, id. at 361-75.
Mr. Justice Douglas, concurring in Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 176
(1961), would find "state action!' also where there is action by an enterprise "affected
with a public interest," "where facilities of a public nature are involved," when a
state "licenses a business." Compare Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 26, 37-44 (1883)
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
YALE

It has been argued that state enforcement of a "custom of segregation" is invalid

state action. See Garner v. Louisiana, supra. See also id. at 178-81 (Douglas,

3.,

concurring). This suggests that the state may be responsible when it enforces segregation in Louisiana, yet not in Massachusetts. Shelley v. Kraemer, of course, would

seem to bar state enforcement of segregation regardless of any custom.
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cases.02 In their sum, these cases and concepts may contribute to the
development of a larger doctrine of state responsibility in relation to
private discrimination.
The cases which concern us, we shall assume, are "strictly
private." They deal with private discriminations which involve no
special relationship of the state to the parties or the property, nor any
organized programs in which private groups are engaged in action of
a "governmental character." Neither are they cases in which the
state is entirely and clearly responsible because it has legislated to require discrimination-for example, by a statute requiring segregation
in places of public accommodation. We are concerned with cases of
private discrimination in which the involvement of the state is only
that its courts are called upon by private parties to give effect to their
discriminations. In such cases, one may suggest three bases, not
wholly discrete, for holding the state responsible.
1. The state is responsible for what it could prevent, and should
prevent, and fails to prevent. State responsibility for what it tolerates
20
The voting cases have suggested, as an alternative ground, that the state
continues to be responsible for discrimination where it once sought to regulate private
activity and later seeks to disengage itself. Cf. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649
(1944); Pollak, supra note 5, at 19-22. See also Public Util. Comm'n v. Pollak,
343 U.S. 451 (1952). This offers a special possibility for deciding cases involving
discrimination about which the state once legislated-say during Reconstruction-and
then repealed the legislation. For example, the State of Mississippi adopted legislation
forbidding racial discrimination by common carriers, innkeepers, restaurants, theaters,
and others. Miss. Laws 1873, ch. 63, § 1, at 67. This was later repealed. (Similar
legislation by Louisiana, also later repealed, was involved in Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S.
485 (1878).) There was also Reconstruction legislation not unlike the act of Congress
which was construed as barring the enforcement of restrictive covenants in the
District of Columbia. See Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948).
The repeal of
legislation of this kind was obviously intended to authorize if not encourage discrimination like that before us. If a state continues to be responsible after it repeals
invalid discriminatory regulation, Smith v. Allwright, supra, it would seem responsible,
a fortiori, when it repeals state legislation in order to make it "lawful" for private
persons to discriminate.
This possibility deserves the advocate's exploration. He will face the argument
that, at least in the Reconstruction cases, the state's "engagement' was brief and
terminated almost one hundred years ago. He will have to insist that disengagement
is not possible even after so long, that the effect of state involvement is not yet
dissipated. If "encouragement' is the important factor, courts may be reluctant to
assume that the citizens of the state are effectively aware of the original legislation
and of its repeal. Surely, they may conclude, any encouragement to discriminate
implied in the repeal of the legislation has long ceased; there is now no greater state
involvement than if such legislation had never been enacted.
The "governmental functionf" argument may also be invoked. Zoning-the determination of the character of neighborhoods-is a function which governments have
exercised and are increasingly exercising. The state, then, is responsible for all
efforts at zoning, its own or those it allows private persons and groups to effectuate.
The restrictive covenant, designed to maintain the homogeneous character of residential
neighborhoods and to support property values, is a private attempt at zoning for
which the state is responsible. See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 5, at 1115-16; Pollak,
supra note 5, at 11; note 24 infra. The argument has greater plausibility where the
facts show a widespread combination and program rather than an isolated attempt
by a private person to select his neighbors. Perhaps the record did not support the
argument in Shelley v. Kraemer.

See also note 54 infra.
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was, in part at least, to some Justices at least, the basis for finding a
constitutional violation in the voting cases. 2 Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Authority,2 decided at the last term of the Supreme Court,
has language which carries further the concept of state responsibility
for what it permits. The case did not involve the very governmental
function of elections; it involved discrimination by a restaurant,
privately operated for private profit, which was leased from a public
authority and was part of a complex of parking and other facilities
built by the state on public land, partly with public funds. The Court
held the state responsible, in part because as lessor it could have insisted on preventing discrimination and failed to do so.2 In the cases
which have held the state responsible for private discrimination which
it could have prevented and failed to prevent, the state had some
special relationship to the function or activity involved-holding elections, governing a town, leasing a restaurant which is part of a public
parking arrangement. This special relationship imposed on the state
the duty to prevent the discrimination. Logically, however, one might
extend the argument very far: the state is responsible whenever it
24
could take action to prevent discrimination and fails to do so.
21

In

"For a state to permit such a duplication of its election processes is to permit
a flagrant abuse of those processes to defeat the purposes of the Fifteenth Amendment."
Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 469 (1953) (Black, J.).
22365 U.S. 715 (1961).
[T]he Authority could have affirmatively required Eagle to discharge the
23
responsibilities under the Fourteenth Amendment imposed upon the private
enterprise as a consequence of state participation. But no State may effectively abdicate its responsibilities by either ignoring them or by merely failing
to discharge them whatever the motive may be. . . . By its inaction . . .
the State . . . has not only made itself a party to the refusal of service, but
has elected to place its power, property and prestige behind the admitted
discrimination.
Id. at 725.
The Court speaks of "responsibilities under the Fourteenth Amendment imposed
upon the private enterprise." This seems careless. The amendment, strictly, imposes
responsibilities only upon the state. One of these state responsibilities may be to
compel the private enterprise to desist from discriminating or for the state to desist
from enforcing the private discrhnination.
24 See also Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 208-09 (1944) (Murphy, J.,
concurring). Compare Pollak, supra note 5, at 20-21.
A substantially similar argument would stress that all rights of property and
contract are governed and protected by law; the state is responsible for them and,
therefore, for discrimination which is perpetrated under the authority of these "rights."
State responsibility on this basis, like responsibility for what the state tolerates, would
destroy the distinction between private and state action under the fourteenth amendment, unless one assumes that there are in fact rights which do not depend on the
state but which enjoy constitutional protection. See text accompanying note 39 infra.
The recognition that all relations and rights are governed by state law has led
others to different conclusions. See Lewis, mipra note 5, at 1108-20. Discussing
Shelley v. Kraemer, Professor Lewis points out that state law and the state legal
system pervade and are being applied when there is a restrictive covenant, whether
or not the state will enforce the covenant. If there is to be any meaning to the distinction between state and private action under the fourteenth amendment, however,
the fact that state law governs is not enough to charge the state with responsibility
for every private action. Nor should state enforcement be critical. Professor Lewis
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Shelley, for example, the state could have outlawed restrictive covenants. By constitutional provision, by statute, or by development
of a common-law policy, the state could have declared restrictive covenants illegal or unenforceable, whether as restraints on alienation or,
as we shall see, in pursuit of equality as a legitimate public purpose
under the state's "police power." Since the state could have forbidden
them, it is responsible for their continued existence, surely for their
enforcement.
2. The state is responsible for discriminationwhich it encourages
A legislative enactment "authorizing discriminatory
sanctions.
or
classification based exclusively on color" is "clearly violative of the
Fourteenth Amendment." 2 5 The reason for this conclusion is not that
the state is delegating a governmental function or otherwise bestowing
authority which the private actor would not otherwise have. 26 Presumably, the state is responsible because it is lending sanction to the
In a Shelley situation,
discrimination and actively encouraging it
believes that "the common law scheme of restrictive covenants should be invalid apart
from affirmative judicial action." Id. at 1114. But cf. note 43 infra. Shelley v.
Kraemer, Professor Lewis thinks, should better stand "for the principle that the
power to enter into a covenant restricting land use and occupancy on the basis of
race is lacking because that part of the common law that provides the particular
property rights necessary for such an arrangement is invalid." Lewis, supra note
5, at 1114. It is invalid because state law and state judicial machinery transform
"private, individual bias into a sort of institutionalized bias" and render it a program
governmental in character for which the state is responsible. Id. at 1118; see note 20
supra.
25
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 726-27 (1961)
(Stewart, J., concurring). Of the three dissenting Justices, Mr. Justice Frankfurter
agrees that this is so "indubitably," id. at 727, and Justices Harlan and Whitaker
"would certainly agree," id. at 729. The majority of the Court did not address itself
to the question.
26 Cf. Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 85, 87, 88 (1932).
27 The reasons for invalidating legislation authorizing racial discrimination are
even stronger if the Justices quoted in note 25 supra had in mind legislation which
authorized discrimination on account of race in circumstances where other discriminations were forbidden. Compare, e.g., the argument in note 54 infra. It was perhaps
such legislation which the dissenting Justices had in mind when they suggested that
there may be a constitutional difference between a statute which "authorizes" discrimination and one which merely declares the common law-say one declaring the
common-law rule that a shopkeeper may serve whom he pleases. Such a statute,
they imply, does not per se render the state responsible; additional state involvement
might be necessary. Of course, even the "common law did not become a part of the
laws of the States by its own vigor. It has been adopted by constitutional provision,
by statute or decision .

.

.

."

Western Union Tel. Co. v. Commercial Milling Co.,

218 U.S. 410, 417 (1910). The Justices apparently did not consider whether the
existence of common-law remedies in the state, particularly if taken together with
legislation declaring the common law, might constitute sufficient encouragement or
sanction to discriminate to render the state responsible. The Justices apparently did
not consider either that in the particular case the legislation was adopted in 1875
and that the statute authorized discrimination not only in restaurants but in inns and
hotels which at common law were not free to discriminate, see Hall v. State, 4 Del.
132, 141 (1844); note 52 infra, apparently for the purpose of affirming a policy of
segregation of Negroes.
In Burton, there was no state enforcement. The state courts had refused declaratory and injunctive relief to the victim of discrimination in an action against the state
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there is usually no legislation authorizing the covenant or other discrimination.2 8 But if a state enforces a covenant under its common
law, even if only by awarding money damages for its breach, "the
result of that sanction by the State would be to encourage the use
of restrictive covenants." 29 A state may not "authorize" or "encourage" discrimination by its common law and the promise of its
courts that they will give it effect."0
3. The state is responsible when its courts act to render discrimination effective. Private persons may discriminate; they may
even, perhaps, use self-help to enforce their discrimination. But if
the state lends the support of its institutions to enforce the discrimination, the state is responsible; without the state's aid, the discrimination
would not be effective.
State effectuation of private discrimination, state encouragement
of private discrimination, perhaps even state toleration of private
discrimination, are possible grounds for holding the state responsible
for discrimination enforced by its courts.3 If the state is responsible
for the discrimination, it is, generally, violating the equal protection
authority claimed to be responsible for the discrimination. Where there is state
enforcement, the dissenting Justices would have to consider that the state may be
responsible on that basis, whether the enforcement is by a remedy available at common law or one of more recent origin. One of the dissenters, Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
was on the Court when it decided Shelley.
28At most there is general legislation codifying or modifying the common law
concerning covenants, the enforcement of contracts, and the vindication of property
rights, for example. See note 27 supra.
2
. 9 Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 254 (1953).
-0 One may say, indeed, that the state is more involved and does more to
encourage discrimination when its courts enforce discrimination than when its legislature merely "authorizes" private persons to discriminate if they wish. Cf. AFL
v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941). While a recent statute adopted in a particular context may exude unusual encouragement and sanction, it is questionable whether, generally, the person subject to law is more "encouraged" by a statute or whether he
even distinguishes between what is permitted him by statute and what he may do
"as of right!' because the state has not barred it and will enforce it. Particularly
if a statute authorizing discrimination is old and long-established, there seems little
basis for an argument that it continues to have more sanction or offers more encouragement than that which was permitted at common law or is a more recent innovation,
judicial in origin, especially if there is a history of judicial enforcement.
31 The alternative arguments do not necessarily have the same consequences.
All of them might prevent a state from taking any official action which would run
contrary to its responsibility; the courts could not enforce the covenant or perhaps
give it any other effect. See note 43 infra. But if the state is responsible merely
because the state could have outlawed the covenant and did not do so, it is responsible
for such contracts even if the state is not enforcing them in its courts. Compare
note 24 supra. While there is no way to compel a state to pass legislation outlawing
the covenant, Congress may be able to outlaw the discrimination under its power to
enforce the amendment's strictures against the state's delinquency. The basis for
congressional action is weak where the state is not enforcing the covenant if state
enforcement is what constitutes the violation of the amendment. To that extent,
arguments based on enforcement-like the Court's opinion in Shelley--are not inconsistent with the Civil Rights Cases. See also note 32 infra.
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clause. In Shelley v. Kraemer, on the grounds given, enforcement by
the state rendered the state responsible for the restrictive covenant and
denied the equal protection of the laws.
B. The Exceptions to Equal Protection
Without more, our emphasis on state responsibility and the
grounds suggested for holding the state responsible do not escape the
-criticisms leveled against the Court's 1948 opinion in Shelley. If the
state is responsible and denies equal protection whenever it enforces
any private discrimination, must this not follow equally when the state
enforces the discriminatory "ejections" and bequests which trouble
the critics? " The answer, we suggest for consideration, lies in a
critical qualification which the Court did not mention, perhaps because
it assumed or concluded that it was not material in the case before it.
The Court wrote-and the critics read-as though all enforcements are
state action and all such state action denies equal protection. The holding and opinion of the Court applied to the facts before it and to other
discriminations in similar relationships. The cases raised by the
critics, however, may lie in an exceptional category in which state
enforcement, although one may call it state action, is not state action
which denies equal protection. In the terms we prefer, we suggest
that those cases reflect circumstances in which a state which enforces
a discrimination is yet not responsible for it; or, even if the state is
responsible for the discrimination, the state nevertheless is not denying
the equal protection of the laws. In those cases, we suggest, there
exist, against the claim of equality, important countervailing rights of
liberty and privacy that enjoy substantial constitutional protection;
these important rights include a protected freedom to discriminate
which the Constitution prefers over the victim's claim to equality and
which the state may be constitutionally permitted-if not requiredto support by judicial remedy.
The Conflict of Liberty and Equality
Here is the crux of the problem and-we suggest tentativelyof its resolution. That there might be another claim with some constitutional title competing with the claim of equality was not mentioned in Shelley. Not very many years earlier, one may guess, the
32

We assume here that all "enforcements" equally render the state responsible.
Perhaps it may be argued that the role of the state in enforcing a covenant is different
from its role when it probates a will or enforces a judgment in trespass. Particularly
if the basis of state responsibility is that enforcement encourages the discrimination,
the different enforcements may differ in the degree of encouragement they lend. See
also note 43 infra. Compare pp. 498-500.
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countervailing claim would have appeared obvious, perhaps even obviously superior. For Shelley and its congeners reflect, of course, the
conflict of competing "rights" of individuals and the responsibilities of
government in relation to this conflict. The Shelleys claim a right to
equality, a right to enjoy the same opportunities as others and to be
free from irrational discrimination on the basis of race or other
capricious irrelevancies. The Kraemers claim basic property rights
and a right of liberty, the freedom to choose one's neighbors, to make
contracts and have them enforced, to deal with whom one chooses, to
leave one's property as one will, to be whimsical, sentimental, irrational, capricious. And the state cannot escape involvement in the
conflict. It must decide whether to encourage, authorize, permit,
tolerate, discourage, or outlaw the freedom to discriminate; it must
decide whether, if the discrimination is not forbidden, the agencies of
government-the courts and the police-will vindicate and support the
"freedom" to discriminate. But the state's choice is not entirely free;
it is limited by the Constitution, particularly by the fourteenth amendment. And that amendment, which forbids the state to deny the
Shelleys equality, also forbids the state to deprive the Kraemers of
property and of liberty "without due process of law." "
No algebraic formula nor any conjuring with the words of the
Constitution can define with precision the limits of the state's choices.
What the fourteenth amendment requires of the state in regard to the
conflicting demands of liberty and equality has appeared different at
different times in the past ninety years. At one time it might have
appeared that the Constitution required that the state remain "neutral."
We now ask what constitutes constitutionally acceptable neutrality. We
ask, again, whether government need be-or can be-"neutral." In
fact, it is now established, neutrality is not required by the Constitution in all instances of this conflict. Changing views of the purpose
of government have been reflected in liberal views of the meliorative
ends which government may pursue. The limitations on the police
33To say that these are conflicting claims is not, of course, to say that they have
equal merit, or that in all circumstances the same claim must prevail. The claim of
liberty, even of the freedom to discriminate, would invoke credentials of "inherent
rights," a birthright antecedent to governments and constitutions. Eighteenth century
theories of "liberal" contractual. government begin with the individual and his freedoms; government and governmental regulation in derogation of liberties must
justify themselves. The Constitution, even after the fourteenth amendment, did not
create or grant these liberties; it merely reconfirmed them and some protection for
them from governmental infringement. The claim to social equality, on the other
hand, the right not to be discriminated against by private caprice, has no "natural"
origin. It had only vague and limited existence before the Constitution, and the
Constitution did not create such right. Even the fourteenth amendment, we have
stressed, did not confer a right of equality in the eyes of one's neighbor. The claim
to equality finds constitutional support in what the Constitution requires of the states
or prohibits to them in relation to this conflict.
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power of the states, subsumed in notions of "substantive due process,"
have been increasingly pushed back. Equality has been recognized as
a legitimate aim of governmental power, a public purpose overriding
the asserted private freedom to be capricious. Although the Supreme
Court has passed directly on only one statute--one which forbade discrimination by labor unions, organizations "functioning under the
protection of the State" 3 4 -it now seems clear that states can actively
promote racial or religious equality by forbidding discrimination in
housing, employment, and public accommodation and enterprise. Mr.
Justice Frankfurter, concurring in Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, disposed of the due process clause, saying: "Elaborately to argue against
this contention is to dignify a claim devoid of constitutional substance. . . . Certainly the insistence by individuals on their private
prejudices as to race, color or creed, in relations like those now before
us, ought not to have a higher constitutional sanction than the determination of a State to extend the area of nondiscrimination beyond
that which the Constitution itself exacts." 35
"Neutrality," then, appears to have become the limit to which
the state may go in favor of the liberty to discriminate on account of
race. In regard to elections, company towns, public parking authorities, and the like, the Constitution requires the state not to be neutral,
but to act to prevent inequality or other infringements. The Constitution may even require the state to act to outlaw the restrictive
covenant if it becomes an instrument for organized segregated "zoning." "I In "private" areas, the state may perhaps be neutral, but the
requirements of neutrality have also changed. We now recognize that
the state is favoring the liberty to discriminate and is not "neutral"
when it enforces the restrictive covenant, whether pursuant to legislation or common law.
Increasing equality of the races is the direction of the Constitution.
But if the Constitution today weighs on the side of equality, claims of
liberty-even of liberty to discriminate on account of race--are not
without constitutional protection. Abiding notions of liberty are protected up to the limit of changing notions of what is due process. If
"substantive due process" has lost the force it had to frustrate economic
regulation, it still has vigor to protect fundamentals of "property";
it subsumes important limitations on the power of the state to regulate
"liberty." In our context, in "relations" not "like those now before
S4 Railway Mail Assn v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88, 94 (1945).
3 5 Id. at 98. (Emphasis added.)
36 See notes 20, 24 vupra. The Court declared restrictive covenants unenforceable in the District of Columbia in part because their enforcement might be contrary
to "the public policy of the United States." Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 34 (1948).
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us" in Corsi or in Shelley, there is, we suggest, a small area of liberty
which the Constitution favors above the claim to equality, even above
the right not to have the state lend its support to inequality. In these
special relationships, despite Corsi, the Constitution would even today
forbid the state to outlaw private discrimination; the state would be
held to be depriving the "discriminator" of liberty without due process
of law, regardless of the state's purpose to create greater "equality."
So, in similar if not identical relationships, we suggest, the claims of
liberty may enjoy such constitutional protection or preference that
the state may support them-by legislation or judicial remedy-in the
face of claims to equality. If considerations of equality in this area
do not constitute "due process of law" to permit deprivation of liberty,
considerations of liberty in similar cases might well also be held to
prevail so as to prevent inevitable insistence on equal protection.
C. Shelley v. Kraemer Qualified
If the competing claims of liberty and the possibility that they
may sometimes prevail are recognized, Shelley v. Kraemer must be
given a more limited reading, and new qualifications must be made to
discussions of state responsibility for discrimination. Shelley, we
would say, holds that generally a state may not enforce discrimination
which it could not itself require or perpetrate. Such enforcement is state
action, makes the state responsible for a denial of equal protection. But
there are circumstances where the discriminator can invoke a protected
liberty which is not constitutionally inferior to the claim of equal protection. There the Constitution requires or permits the state to favor
the right to discriminate over the victim's claim to equal protection;
the state, then, is not in violation of the fourteenth amendment when
it legislates or affords a remedy in support of the discrimination.3 7 This
may perhaps be viewed as a form of "reasonable classification," the
traditional basis for permissible discriminations under the equal protection clause."
It may, instead, be viewed as the result of the inevitable need to choose between competing constitutional rights; when
the equal protection clause and the due process clause conflict, the
equal protection clause prevails except in the small area where liberty
has its special claim.
The concept of state responsibility may afford a justification of
this result in somewhat different terms. We suggested that the state
See note 42 infra.
38 This is not, of course, the traditional "reasonable classification" which permits
the state, if it wishes to regulate, to regulate some classes and not others or to regulate
different classes differently. Here the Constitution itself determines the "classes,"
forbids the state to enforce discrimination in most cases, and permits-or requires-the state to enforce discrimination in the special cases. Compare text accompanying
note 55 infra; note 54 infra.
37
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may be responsible when it enforces discrimination because it encourages and sanctions discrimination or renders it effective; we suggested that logically a state may even be held responsible for discrimination which it tolerates. But responsibility implies important
limitations. On the extreme ground, if the basis of responsibility is
state toleration, the state should be responsible for failing to act only
where it can act. The state should not be responsible where it cannot
prevent a particular private action or discrimination because to do so
would deprive the discriminator of liberty without due process of law.
Again, taking the narrower ground, the state which enforces a discrimination is not invariably "responsible" for encouraging or giving
effect to the discrimination. Whether or not the state is constitutionally bound to afford a remedy for violation of "basic rights," 39 the
fact that the state does afford such a remedy to the discriminator-a
traditional remedy for an established right-would seem to offer very
little encouragement or sanction to the discrimination. The state, we
suggest, may "give effect" to such private discrimination, as it gives
effect to other traditional rights of private property for which, too, the
state is not "responsible," in the sense that under the Constitution the
state could not freely deprive the individual of these property rights.40
Shelley v. Kraemer was not wrongly decided. It is not a special
case. It need not be rejected; it need not be narrowly limited. The
rule laid down by the Court in 1948 is a good rule: generally, a state
may not enforce private discrimination. The special cases, we suggest,
are rather those few where the state supports that basic liberty, privacy,
autonomy, which outweighs even the equal protection of the laws.
D. The Balance of Liberty Against Equality
The role and the responsibility of the state, we suggest, may be
critically different in different situations in which the state is "en39
Under the remains of Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921), a state may
be constitutionally required to afford at least some kind of remedy for the protection
of some "basic" rights of property or liberty. (Compare Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
(1 Cranrch) 137, 163 (1803). Are there echoes of this in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1961)?) The special cases where the right to discriminate is constitutionally
protected may be expressions of these basic rights for which a remedy is required.
Surely enforcement cannot be a constitutional violation if the Constitution in fact
requires the state to enforce the discrimination. If the Constitution requires a state
to afford a judicial remedy, say, to a homeowner against a trespasser, even if the
latter is ejected on account of race, the state can hardly be held responsible for
affording the remedy.
While the continuing authority of Truax v. Corrigan has been questioned, at
least part of the opinion was recently invoked by the Court in NAACP v. Gallion,
368 U.S. 16, 17 (1961).
40We refer, of course, to the responsibility of the states-not only of the state
legislatures. It is not significant, then, that a state legislature may be barred from
outlawing discrimination by the state constitution. Cf. Snith v. Allwright, 321 U.S.
649, 654-56 (1944).
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forcing private discrimination." One may begin with the principleannounced by the Court in Shelley-that generally the state is responsible and is violating the equal protection clause when its courts enforce
private discrimination. The state is not violating that clause, we
qualify, when it enforces discriminations in those few relations which
are constitutionally protected from state interference, or which the
Constitution requires or allows the state to prefer.
The suggested principle does not, of course, end the need of inquiry, or supply easy answers; indeed, it moves the focus of the inquiry
into areas from which precision may be even more removed. What
is that small area of "liberty" which prevails even over the equal protection clause? How does one balance competing claims of different
constitutional protections? How much weight is to be given to the
particular role which the state wishes to play in the conflict? There
will be difficult cases. But the need to balance conflicting constitutional
rights to determine the limits of state responsibility and power has been
recognized and faced by the Court in many circumstances, some closely
related to our case. "When we balance the Constitutional rights of
owners of property against those of the people to enjoy freedom of press
and religion, as we must here," said Mr. Justice Black for the Court
in Marsh v. Alabama,4 the Court must conclude that the circumstances
are "not sufficient to justify the State's permitting a corporation to
govern a community of citizens so as to restrict their fundamental
liberties and the enforcement of such restraint by the application of a
state statute." 42 It may be difficult to decide what are the weights to
41 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
42Id. at 509. See also the opinion of the Court in Saia v. New York, 334 U.S.
558, 562 (1948) (Douglas, J.) ("Courts must balance the various community interests
in passing on the constitutionality of local regulations of the character involved
here."); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 373 (1947) (Douglas, J.); Thornhill v.
Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 96 (1940) (Murphy, J.) ("It is imperative that, when the
effective exercise of these rights is claimed to be abridged, the courts should 'weigh
the circumstances' and 'appraise the substantiality' of the reasons advanced in support
of the challenged regulations. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161, 162.") ; cf. Bates
v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449
(1958). Compare Holmes, J., in Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S.
349, 355 (1908). There are differences as to how much of the balancing should be
left to the states. In Saia, Mr. justice Jackson disagreed "entirely" with the idea
that it is the courts who must balance. "It is for the local communities to balance
their own interests-that is politics-and what courts should keep out of. Our only
function is to apply constitutional limitations.' 334 U.S. at 571 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
The "balancing" we invoke here is not to be confused with the "balancing" in
another context, in which it threatens to become a shibboleth which is held to betray
an inadequate respect by those who invoke it for some liberties protected by the
Constitution. There are some Justices and some critics who are concerned primarily
with protecting so-called "first amendment rights" against what they deem to be tooready infringement in the name of "balancing." Those rights are not involved here.
(Indeed, the closest to a "first amendment right" is that of the person who seeks to discriminate, asserting a right of "nonassociation.") Nor are we suggesting balancing a
private right against some alleged public purpose; what would be balanced are com-
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be put in the balances, to determine which balance outweighs. The
task and the process inhere in constitutional government and cannot
be avoided. The state is always balancing and choosing between
"rights." The constitutional question is whether a particular choice
is permissible. The state may balance and choose between competing
private claims of property or liberty, within the limits of due process
of law. The state may, we suggest, choose between the liberty of one
and the equality of another, within narrow constitutional limits reflecting the competing considerations underlying the equal protection
clause and the "hard core" of liberty and property that remains in the
due process clause. This difficult task could not be avoided if the
state legislated in favor of either side in this conflict. It cannot be
avoided either, we believe, if the courts, pursuant to general legislation
or common law, would decide in favor of either claim.43
peting private rights, where some choice is inevitable and is frequently involved, even
if only tacitly. Admittedly, the state policy for a "public purpose"-say, antitrustmay frequently appear as a protection of competing private interest. Cf. Giboney
v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949).
As the above quotations indicate, all would admit that in many circumstances
the Constitution allows-or requires-government to favor one right over another
which conflicts with it. It is necessary to balance the effect on a defendants right
to a fair trial of another's right to comment on a pending trial. It is even necessary
to set against A's right to speak B's right not to listen. It was necessary to set the
Negro's right to equal, integrated schools against a white child's "right' not to
associate with Negroes. Balancing does not, of course, preclude the view that the
Constitution permits, or requires, giving some rights special, preferred weight.
Thornhill and the other picketing cases afford instructive analogy, if not precedent,
as an area where a right protected by the Constitution is limited by the protected
rights of others; when private rights conflict, the state must balance them and the
Court will check the balance. In those cases, picketing is recognized as involving,
in substantial degree, a form of communication protected by the Constitution. But
the scope of the freedom of communication of the picketing employee depends, in
effect, on the scope of the employees' right of association, or-described from another
vantage point-on the area of protection which the state may constitutionally afford
to the property rights of the one picketed. The fourteenth amendment, one should say
today, does not permit a state to declare union organization for collective bargaining
unlawful; it cannot therefore forbid picketing to that end. Thornhill v. Alabama,
supra. (While the continuing authority of Thornhill has been put in question, see,
e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957), the Court
decided a case on its authority in 1958. Chauffeurs Union v. Newell, 356 U.S. 341
(1958) (per curiam).) The state may, however, forbid picketing for purposes which
it may declare unlawful. The fourteenth amendment, for example, does not prevent
a state from declaring the secondary boycott to be unlawful, and the state may therefore outlaw picketing to that end. Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., supra.
See also Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1950), where the Court held
that California may bar picketing designed to achieve a form of racial discrimination
in employment. In effect, the picket's right to free speech is balanced against the
property rights of the person picketed with different results where different degrees
of right result in a different balance. A pickets right to free speech may overbalance the property rights of an employer but not the rights of one who is a stage
removed from the labor dispute.
43The emphasis here is on the sanction and encouragement afforded by state
judicial enforcement of the discrimination. One may have to consider whether all
forms of "enforcement," civil or criminal, afford identical degrees of sanction. One
needs to consider too whether other roles of the state, other effects which the state
might give to the discrimination, constituting lesser degrees of encouragement and
sanction, might yet contravene the fourteenth amendment. Even legislation of different
kinds at different times in different contexts may effect encouragement or sanction
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In the end, whether the freedom to discriminate may surpass the
claim to equality and how "neutral" the forces of law may be in that
conflict can only be decided in the light of a complex of considerations
of varying import and relevance. The balance may be struck differently
at different times, reflecting differences in prevailing philosophy and
the continuing movement from laissez-faire government toward welfare and meliorism. The changes in prevailing philosophy themselves
may sum up the judgment of judges as to how the conscience of our
society weighs the competing needs and claims of liberty and equality
in time and context-the adequacy of progress toward equality as a
result of social and economic forces, the effect of lack of progress on
the life of the Negro and, perhaps, on the image of the United States,
and the role of official state forces in advancing or retarding this
progress.
Some principles, some guides to the process of balancing, can
be suggested. One begins with the principal emphases of the two
competing constitutional clauses themselves. The equal protection
clause has recently-in the school segregation cases-gained new significance, emphasizing the unacceptable consequences of organized,
public, prominent inequalities for whose existence the state is principally responsible. "Liberty" and "property," on the other hand,
have also slowly developed dearer definition in the due process
dialectic; the Constitution protects against easy state encroachment in
a small area of "hard-core" property rights and "preferred" liberties.
Other guidelines may be suggested. To help decide whether state
courts may enforce a discrimination, one might ask, for example,
whether the state could outlaw by legislation the particular discrimination. The power to legislate against a particular discrimination
would be a hypothetical question, and a different constitutional question, also difficult to answer. Strictly, the constitutional question there
is whether equality is sufficient "due process" to justify the deprivation
of liberty; our question is whether the liberty of the discriminator is
sufficient to constitute a countervailing reasonable basis to justify the
state in enforcing inequality in the face of the equal protection clause.
But similar considerations are relevant to both answers. And courts
have had more experience in scrutinizing legislative choices and weighing them in constitutional scales." Whether a state could legislate
in different degrees with different constitutional consequences. Compare notes 20,
30 supra; text accompanying notes 25-30 mupra. Conflicting interests, we suggest,
must be balanced in relation to what the state wishes to do about them. Of course,
this adds yet another variable which may determine the result in some cases. See,
e.g., Charlotte Park & Recreation Comm'n v. Barringer, 242 N.C. 311, 88 S.E.2d 114
(1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 983 (1956).
44 One might also ask whether a state could affirmatively authorize discrimination
in the particular case. Cf. text accompanying note 25 supra. But that is a rare type
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against the discrimination also affords some direct guidance to whether
it can enforce such discrimination. 5 If discrimination could not be
forbidden by legislation, one may conclude that the state is permitted
to enforce the discrimination. That the state legislature could not
outlaw the discrimination-in the face of the "public policy of the
United States" in favor of equality,4 6 the holding in Corsi, the Court's
reluctance to invoke substantive due process, and the "presumption"
of constitutionality-suggests a basic and sacred liberty. Protecting
such a liberty would seem clearly reasonable for a state under an equal
protection clause which generally admits of "reasonable classifications."
If the legislature, on the other hand, might outlaw a particular discrimination, the state may surely refuse to enforce that discrimination.
That the state is also forbidden to enforce it is not a logical corollary,47
but this conclusion may follow from the trend of constitutional development which generally forbids the state to sanction, encourage, or
give effect to racial discrimination.4 8
Different rights competing with equality will, of course, weigh
differently in the balance. "Property rights" have long ceased to have
meaningful meaning, and calling something a property right has long
ceased, ipso facto, to invoke constitutional protection and exclude governmental regulation. But there are, and remain, property rights and
property rights, and there are liberties and liberties, with claims of
varying weight to preference and protection in our American, constitutional, federal legal system grown to its present form out of roots in
of legislation, difficult for the courts to handle, and one with which they have little
experience. Presumably, however, there may indeed be special instances where the
state may by legislation affirmatively "authorize" discrimination-perhaps in the home,
perhaps in distribution of property by will. It was perhaps such legislation which
the dissenting Justices in Burton had in mind when they distinguished legislation
"declaring the common law." See note 27 mipra. That description seems too broad.
See text accompanying notes 48, 50 infra.
45If discrimination could not be forbidden by legislation, the state might indeed
be required under Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921), to enforce the discrimination. But even if that case were not followed, or were held not to apply in the face
of the equal protection clause, one might conclude that the state is permitted to enforce
the discrimination. See note 39 .tipra and accompanying text.
46See note 36 supra.
471n fact, whether a state legislature could in given circumstances bar the right
to discriminate in favor of the right to equality may pose a hypothetical question of
inherent unreliability. If a legislature, it might be said, in fact reached the point of
passing such legislation, the fact of legislation and the circumstances impelling the
legislation may also adequately support a presumption of constitutionality. Judicial
enforcement of a discrimination by a common-law remedy may not enjoy as strong a
presumption of validity. Using the legislative power as a test, then, may leave a
smaller area in which the power to discriminate is favored than if the conflicting rights
were balanced in relation to the enforcement itself.
48
Nevertheless, theoretically at least, there may be instances where liberty may
rank high enough to permit its judicial enforcement against claims of equality, although
not to withstand legislative preference for equality, unless a state may not tolerate
discrimination which it can prevent. See text accompanying notes 21-24 siupra.
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the common law. History will be relevant to remind us how rooted
and how cherished are some of our rights, how mistaken, on the
contrary, are assumptions about the aged validity of others, how
changed are the circumstances and how different therefore must be
the weight to be given to some asserted rights today. It is not what
we were only; sometimes it is rather what we have become-as in the
protection of religious diversity and idiosyncrasy. There seems little
basis, on the other hand, for the suggestion that whatever was protected "at common law," or in a particular state's common law, is
immutable or invariably has great weight in the balance of the fourteenth amendment. It seems difficult to find precedent, analogy, or
argument for such distinctions based on the state of the law at some
time other than when the amendment was adopted. What may be
distinguished are those rights, sometimes-not wholly accuratelylabeled "common-law" rights, whose roots are deep in our past and
which time only imbeds further, rights which in our society are fundamentals of individual autonomy and privacy.
E. The Revised Doctrine Applied
We sum up: Generally, the equal protection clause precludes state
enforcement of private discrimination. There is, however, a small
area of liberty favored by the Constitution even over claims to equality.
Rights of liberty and property, of privacy and voluntary association,
must be balanced, in close cases, against the right not to have the state
enforce discrimination against the victim. In the few instances in
which the right to discriminate is protected or preferred by the Constitution, the state may enforce it.
The Case of the Restrictive Covenant
Shelley v. Kraemer is not a close case: the state, we conclude,
cannot, under the Constitution, prefer the rights of Kraemer on his
contract to the right of Shelley not to have inequality imposed upon
him. Kraemer is asserting rights under a covenant in support of the
desire of most of the homeowners on the street to select their neighbors. They are asserting rights acquired by contract, not traditional
incidents of their rights in their property. Their association is loose
and imperfect. It has no intimate ties or purpose; anyone is welcome
to buy and live there except Negroes and "Mongolians." The restriction serves no purpose except racial prejudice and the economic consequences of this prejudice. Shelley, for his part, asserts his right to
buy and occupy a home where he can. He asserts the right not to
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have Negro ghettoes created by maintaining white ghettoes.4 9 He asks
that the state not prefer the old contract over his new one, that it not
lend support to organized zoning for an improper purpose, to a discrimination which has no basis but race and serves no purpose but
prejudice.
The state, with its law of contracts, has to choose here between
contracts, a later one in breach of an earlier one. As clearly as in
Corsi, the state could, in the face of the due process clause, outlaw the
restrictive covenant by statute or by common-law policy. The restrictive covenant has no special sanctity, and its enforcement is not
compelled by hallowed history. States have with considerable freedom
modified the bounds of the areas of contract to which they will give
effect. Restraints on alienation were denied enforcement at different
times and places "at common law." " The state cannot hide behind
the individual's "liberty" of contract and encourage the discrimination
by enforcing it. It cannot prefer this right of contract to this claim
of equality.
The Cases Beyond Shelley
Shelley v. Kraemer, we believe, is not affected by our qualification.
Many other discriminations will, similarly, be clearly within its doctrine. Some, inevitably, will be close and difficult cases. Since the
area we except depends on the balance of liberty over equality, it
should not be surprising if questions of degree become critical, if businesses or organizations with small claim to liberty to discriminate fare
differently from individuals, if impersonal contexts give different answers than do more intimate associations. It might even be found that
discrimination against the Negro has consequences, and therefore
evokes responses, different from discrimination on grounds of religion,
especially if the discrimination itself has some religious basis and is
not designed to perpetuate the inferior status of a weak minority. Even
the liberty to discriminate on the basis of race may have better claim
49
The residential segregation of races by the state was held unconstitutional while
other kinds of segregation-in "separate but equal" facilities-were constitutionally
respectable and destined to remain so for thirty-seven years more. See Buchanan v.

Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
50 VJWle it is not entirely clear, at common law covenants restraining alienation
indefinitely or for long periods were probably not enforceable. See the discussion
and authorities cited in Mandlebaum v. McDonell, 29 Mich. 78 (1874), and De
Peyster v. Michael, 6 N.Y. 467 (1852). The Court of Appeals of Maryland in Meade
v. Dennistone, 173 Md. 295, 196 Atl. 330 (1937), concluded that a covenant restraining
alienation to a Negro was not enforceable at common law but that restrictions on
Negro occupancy were enforceable. Even this may deserve reexamination. The rule
may have developed from cases involving restrictions on noxious uses. See Foster v.
Stewart, 134 Cal. App. 482, 25 P.2d 497 (Dist. Ct. App. 1933); Yoshida v. Gelbert
Improvement Co., 58 Pa. D. & C. 321 (C.P. 1946).
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to protection in some future day if the targets of private discrimination
enjoy substantial strength and equality in the American society.
Whether one case or another will fall outside the rule of Shelley
v. Kraemer cannot be determined in the abstract. For discussion, however, one may venture some guesses. The import of the qualification
which we propose is reflected in the hypothetical cases which troubled
the critics. Applying the proposed principle to those cases would not,
I believe, give answers which Professor Wechsler found incredible
and which Professor Pollak felt compelled to accept with his
qualification.
Under today's concepts of due process, we have suggested, the
state may not forbid a person to be whimsical or capricious in his
social relations or as to whom he will admit to his home. One need
not insist on any absolute immunity or inviolability to suggest that
the home continues to enjoy major constitutional protection, that competing rights-even claims to equality-would rarely weigh comparably, that a chief function of the state is to preserve this privacy.
Surely the fourteenth amendment did not intend to compel the states
to change the scope of this private autonomy or to prevent the state
from giving effect to traditional rights of privacy and property by its
traditional common-law remedies. Even when one excludes on the
basis of race, the state which helps give effect to the exclusion is implementing a general, basic, proprietary right, reaching far back into
and behind the common law; the enforcement of discrimination is incidental. The victim of such discrimination, on the other hand, suffers
a minor limitation and a limited and unpublic indignity.
For the state, then, to decree that one may not bar Catholics, or
redheaded persons, or even Negroes from his home would, I believe,
be a violation of rights of privacy-of free association and nonassociation-under the fourteenth amendment. Since the state cannot prevent the discrimination, it is not responsible for it. Since the Constitution protects that right and favors it over the victim's claim to
equality, the state may surely-under laws of general applicabilitygive effect to these prejudices incidental to basic rights by sending its
police to eject a trespasser or by lending the weight of its tort law or
even its criminal law.
It may be a different matter when a storekeeper, restaurateur, or
innkeeper, who opens to all, refuses entry to some on the basis of race.
"The more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for use
by the public in general, the more do his rights become circumscribed
by the . . . constitutional rights of those who use it." "'
5, Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946).

In these rela-
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tionships, the state could outlaw the discrimination. Generally, the
discrimination is public, blatant, and widespread; the inequality and
indignity therefore notorious and extensive, with important communal consequences. On the other scale, the relationship of owner to
prospective clients and that of customers with each other are superficial, not intimate. The storekeeper is not asserting the general right
to select his associates; in general, indeed, he welcomes all. Race
alone is the basis of discrimination, and frequently it is not because
of the caprice of the store owner but because he would cater to the
caprices of the community. The economic advantages of a "restricted
clientele" are part of the pattern of discrimination and would fail if
discrimination disappeared. It is not a general property right which
the state would be enforcing but, usually, a community pattern of
racial discrimination; this the state cannot sanction, encourage, or
support. The state, at common law and since, has subjected the storekeeper to innumerable regulations; ' it cannot insist that it must leave
him-and enforce-his right to discriminate. It cannot favor this
right over the claim to equality.
The discriminatory bequest of an otherwise valid will may also
present different situations where different rights must be balanced
against the claim of equality to determine whether the state may probate the will and give effect to the discrimination. It may be that the
role of the state in "enforcing" a will is different from its role in
enforcing a covenant or a liability or penalty for trespass. In our
system, the state's role is indispensable to giving the will any effect.
Does its role constitute sufficient sanction and encouragement to discrimination to make the state responsible?
The rights involved are, of course, critical. While the power to
leave property by will is hardly as sacrosanct an incident of property
as is the autonomy of the home, it is a right which our society still
accepts as basic to the institution of property.5 In general, the right
of testators to be capricious is an old right, commonly exercised, generally given effect. The state which administers wills is giving effect
to a general right of the testator to dispose of his property as he sees
fit; there will frequently be some kind of irrational discrimination
52 The innkeeper and the carrier, at least, could not exclude on account of race
at common law. See Newton v. Trigg, 1 Show. K.B. 268, 89 Eng. Rep. 566 (1691) ;
BEALE, TaE LAW OF INNKEEPERS AND HoTELs 42, 45-46 (1906); STORY, BAMMENTS
§§475-76, 591 (9th ed. 1878).
53 "[N]o one can compel the covenantor to sell his property in violation of his
restrictive agreement or otherwise force him to desist from abiding by his covenant.
To do so would be to invade his constitutionally guaranteed right of dominion over
his own property. And, that would be no less true of Stephen Girard's trust were
we to hold that . . . he has been guilty of an unconstitutional discrimination. .. "
Girard College Trusteeship, 391 Pa. 434, 453, 138 A.2d 844, 852, appeal dismsred and
cert. denied, 357 U.S. 570 (1958).
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involved. The right of the claimant to an equal benefice, even to have
social discrimination eliminated from the motivations of private donors,
does not cry urgently for protection. It is a small private wrong. As
a rule, then, the state can give effect to this traditional aspect of property without examining the basis of the discrimination. So under the
due process clause, I should guess, a state cannot prevent an individual
from leaving property to A rather than B, both strangers, even if the
reason is that A is white and B a Negro-at least if the state permits
leaving property to strangers at all.
On the other hand, the state has from the days of the common
law exercised substantial control, in the name of "public policy," over
the power to bequeath. The balance may begin to shift as the testator
leaves the area of private bequests and begins to discriminate institutionally. Even there the state probably cannot today prevent a testator
from leaving money to a religious institution; religious association and
its support today enjoy substantial constitutional protection. There
might be a less weak case for saying that a state can forbid "discrimination" between white and Negro charities. Very likely, the state
can prevent a testator from leaving property to a private institution,
nonreligious in character, which practices religious or racial discrimination. Here giving effect to the bequest is likely to be a public,
notorious fact, feeding community patterns of discrimination. The
testator's interests, on the other hand, are more removed. The discrimination may not even be his own; in any event, his interest in
insisting on discrimination by others against others does not appear
to weigh heavily in the constitutional scale. A strong case, then, might
be made for saying that the state cannot prefer the testator's right to
discriminate in this manner, and so cannot probate or administer such
a will. The same result can perhaps be justified in the somewhat different case of the will of Stephen Girard-a bequest to establish an
institution for white students only.
Perhaps I am mistaken in these hesitant particular conclusions,
conclusions which can only be reached after careful weighing of relevant facts and considerations. But an awareness of the process and the
issues involved is essential, and some formula to guide those who hold
the balances inevitable. The process of balancing rights and choosing
between them when need be may itself be seen as a critical aspect of the
due process of law.

III. Shelley

IN SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE

The doctrine we have suggested for consideration-more tentatively than may seem from the tone of an. attempt to persuade-would
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reaffirm the result and the reasons in Shelley v. Kraemer for most
cases; the obligation of the state to refrain from enforcing inequality
is clear and paramount. It recognizes, however, a competing interest
of liberty and privacy, including a right to discriminate, which in some
circumstances has substantial constitutional protection.
The problem of Shelley inevitably requires the adjustment of competing constitutional claims. The proposed solution seems directed to
the nature of the problem; its approach seems almost inevitable. A
more exact and fixed line might be easier to apply; none has been suggested to date with better claim to relevance and consistency; none has
been suggested which seems to meet the changing demands of the
Constitution.5 The particularistic answer can be avoided only by one
of two "simple absolutes." Either one must hold that the state cannot
enforce any unreasonable discrimination whatever, or one must overrule Shelley v. Kraemer (or find for it a special, narrow justification
on its facts) and accept the doctrine that, although a state may not
encourage or sanction discrimination by statute, it may enforce all
forms of inequality regardless of the sanction and encouragement to
discrimination which that entails. Both extremes seem undesirable.
What seems called for is a position between the extremes, which suggests the need for a standard depending on degree, like that of due
54 It has been suggested as a narrower alternative approach that the state may be
violating the equal protection clause when it adopts a "public policy" for not enforcing
some contracts and fails to invoke "public policy" to refuse enforcement of other
contracts, unless there is some reasonable basis for selecting the contracts not to be
enforced. Compare Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 334-39 (1921). The question,
then, would be whether a state which refuses to enforce, say, usury contracts can insist
on enforcing restrictive covenants. The answer would depend on relevant social and
political values, although perhaps not the same ones we invoke for our formula.
See pp. 491-96.
This suggestion is indeed narrower and less novel. Compare note 38 supra. It
would, however, require a complete rejection of the Court's opinion in Shelley. It
would reaffirm that enforcement by a state, pursuant to a general principle in favor
of enforcement, is not forbidden by the equal protection clause despite any sanction
or encouragement to discrimination by individuals who make the discriminating
choices involved. It implies also what the equal protection clause does not usually
require-that, in this respect at least, even the state's common law must present a
coherent and consistent pattern: a state would be required to deal with all these "evils"
at the same time and consistently. A state legislature which could outlaw both
restrictive covenants and usurious contracts may do one and not the other without
inquiring whether there is any basis for dealing with one and not the other, and there
is no violation of the equal protection clause. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co.,
304 U.S. 144, 151 (1938) ; West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937).
Under this suggestion, however, the equal protection clause would bar a state from
adopting a public policy of nonenforcement as to one kind of contract without doing
the same for the other unless there were a reasonable basis for the selection. One
might ask also whether "public policy" as a ground for nonenforcement is a "category"
to which the equal protection clause applies. Must different reasons for nonenforcement of contracts be comparable? Can they not be treated as separate categories for
purposes of classification under the equal protection clause?
Whether this suggestion would lead to the Court's result in Shelley v. Kraemer
is not clear. And if it should be found to be unreasonable to enforce restrictive
covenants but not usury contracts, the result might be to impel the state not to deny
enforcement to restrictive covenants but to grant enforcement to usury contracts.
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process. That standard in fact is the one which the Court would
apply if the state legislated to regulate these same rights of liberty or
property; it is the standard by which the Court would test legislation
to outlaw discrimination in a particular context. A standard like
this, we suggest, seems appropriate when the state steps into the conflict through its courts rather than by legislation.
Shelley v. Kraemer, even with the qualification we have proposed,
entails important changes in the jurisprudence of the fourteenth
amendment. It is, however, consistent with the theory of the Constitution and of the fourteenth amendment in particular. It does not
bar private discrimination per se. The state is not required to outlaw
all discrimination or to assure complete equality. There are areas of
private autonomy in which the individual can continue to discriminate
and the state may enforce that discrimination. The proposed formula
puts responsibility on the states when they have power, not when that
power is denied them. It avoids distinctions between action and inaction which have troubled the law and which have been inconsistently
applied. It puts the common law of a state generally on the same
footing as its legislation, rejects distinctions between the written law
and the unwritten, and makes the state responsible for both. It affords,
I believe, a rational explanation for many cases for which a different
rationale was given by the courts. It is consistent with what the Supreme Court did, even with what it said, in Shelley v. Kraemer; the
qualification added applies to the cases beyond Shelley. The doctrine
proposed is also, I believe, the direction in which the law and the
courts are and should be moving.
The "solution," then, appears to fit the established rubrics of constitutional law, to satisfy the demand for "neutral," general principles
of adjudication, to deal logically with the cases which have arisen, and
to promise consistent application to foreseeable situations. More, it
affords a guide for resolving fundamental difficulties in the philosophy
of our constitutional government. For behind the invocation and
analysis of concepts and categories like "state action" and "state responsibility" lie the perennial dilemmas of conflicting freedoms and
of the conflict of freedom and government under the Constitution.
The formula we have suggested uncovers and underscores an area of
competing claims and purposes for the equal protection and due
process clauses. It recognizes an area of liberty which escapes the
compulsions of the equal protection clause-an area analogous to, if not
congruent with, the area of liberty which escapes compulsions of
equality under the due process clause. It adopts the direction of constitutional development and assumes that in balancing the respective
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sanctities of liberty and equality, the area of compelled equality is
growing, but an area of privacy remains sacrosanct. It puts the state
on the side of equality, giving advantage to the victim of discrimination and calling on him who would discriminate to show that the Constitution protects his right to discriminate, forbids the state from
interfering, and permits the state to give effect to his discrimination.
The implications of the proposed approach cannot be overlooked.
It may be urged that the formula provides that the state may enforce
a discrimination only where it must enforce it, that it leaves no area
of state neutrality-no discretion for states to experiment and differ.
If this is accepted as the consequence, it may yet be justified: what we
are doing is carving a limited area of exception to the generality of
Shelley v. Kraemer that a state may not enforce discrimination. This
is the consequence of the preferred weight which the Constitution gives
to equality. In fact, of course, the result suggested would not necessarily follow from the formula. What is essential to it is only the
recognition that in some circumstances the Constitution permits the
state to enforce a private discrimination because of the favored right
of the discriminator. In these circumstances the state may enforce;
whether it must enforce is less clear and is not essential to the suggestion.55 In any event, there remains for the states scope for discretion and difference as to whether and where they will make discrimination a crime or what effects they may give to the discrimination other
than to enforce it.
We must also accept the implications for cases which do not
involve racial and religious discrimination. Shelley v. Kraemer, the
critics have noted, seems to assert that state enforcement renders the
state responsible for any private action which it enforces. This should
include as well state enforcement of a will in which a testator
capriciously chooses A rather than B, state enforcement of an ejectment where the homeowner capriciously has B but not A removed from
his home, state enforcement of a contract which the vendor capriciously
has made with A in preference to B. If Shelley applies to these cases,5
the qualification we have suggested would require us to say that here
again the state may enforce because the testator's, the homeowner's,
the vendor's liberties prevail over the alleged claims to equality. And
5
5 Whether the state must enforce these rights depends on what Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921), is today. See note 39 iepra.
56 One may perhaps argue that the doctrine of Shelley v. Kraemer, as qualified,
should apply only to racial and religious discrimination. State enforcement of the
individual, private, ad hoc whim or caprice does not really encourage or sanction
any person to be whimsical or to adopt a particular whim; the bases for individual
irrationality are too numerous to be generalized. Surely state enforcement in this
kind of case does not contribute to a widespread pattern of institutionalized dis-

crimination on a particular ground with important social and communal consequences.
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indeed, their rights would seem to have sufficient constitutional favor
over the rights of a might-be beneficiary, an unwelcome guest, or a
would-be purchaser, who demands that the state refrain from enforcing
caprice, when the caprice is not based on religion or race but on some
other private whim. Perhaps one may go so far as to say that where
racial or religious discrimination is not involved we may presume,
generally, that the equal protection claim is flimsy, that the claim of
liberty is substantial, and that the state is free to enforce the private
discrimination. Even this disposition, of course, would still inject into
many an ordinary will, trespass, or sale a constitutional question where
before Shelley none appeared to exist. But, in fact, the constitutional
question always existed and always exists as to every action or omission by the state. The state governs in the constant shadow of the
Constitution. The due process clause in particular is ever hovering
in the background, and the equal protection clause waits in the wings.
We do not notice, because in the vast majority of situations the claim
that the Constitution is violated is so insubstantial as no longer to be
respectably raised. This is the case with the mass of state legislation,
as to which, theoretically, one can raise a question of substantive due
process or of equal protection. This is what we would decide if the
question were raised in the cases we are discussing, even in some of
the racial-religious cases mentioned above.
It must also be recognized, finally, that we are invoking "substantive due process"--or something quite like it-to form an exception or a reasonable classification under the equal protection clause.
Constitutional limitations with the vague outlines of "due process of
law," with the assumption of values and choice between values which
that concept entails, are not favored. The trend in some areas has
been to reduce the scope and impact of that limitation; the suggested
approach may appear to give to substantive due process new vitality
and an additional domain. But while the notion that due process implies a particular economic philosophy has been happily abandoned, the
r equirement of due process continues to protect even "property" to an
extent; and it has had sustained, perhaps increasing, vitality for the
protection of "liberty." In the suggested approach, the protection
which due process would afford as against claims of equality is precisely in the area where an individual's right of "property" may be
viewed as a right of "liberty," where "hard-core" property rights
and the "basic" liberty of privacy and association coincide and flourish.
Of course, what we suggest will cast yet another burden on judges
to scrutinize what the states-usually state judges-have weighed first.
It adds another area where judges must exercise judgment, weigh the
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ponderable and the imponderable, measure the measurable and the immeasurable. But the judgment demanded is not different from that
already demanded in constitutional adjudication-in determining the
limits of "unreasonable" searches and seizures and "cruel and unusual"
punishment, of "ordered liberty" and "due" process of law, of almost
every other constitutional provision although it be speciously unambiguous, of the principle and limits of growth of the "constitution
we are expounding." The balancing here required is not too different
from that in which judges must indulge when other constitutional
rights compete or when a local interest seeks to justify some burden
on interstate commerce. Sophistication and "realism" have long taught
that there is no escape from-or anodyne for-the pains of judgment,
of drawing lines, of weighing, balancing, distinguishing, and dividing.
In constitutional exposition, as elsewhere, much "depends upon differences of degree. The whole law does so as soon as it is civilized." 57
The judge's task under our increasingly particularistic Constitution
demands sadly rare judicial qualities which can only be epitomized as
"wisdom"; the creative character of the Constitution cannot be denied
from fear that wise judges may not be available to keep it alive.
57
Holmes, J., partially concurring, in LeRoy Fibre Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P.
Ry., 232 U.S. 340, 354 (1914).

